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SHAREHOLDER-EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION
IN THE PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION:
PRESENT AND DEFERRED
COMPENSATION ARRANGEMENTS
David E. Crabtree*
INTRODUCTION

On August 8, 1969, the Internal Revenue Service conceded that a
professional corporation organized under a valid state law would be
treated as a corporation within the federal tax laws.1 Although the professional corporation thus achieved a recognized corporate status for
tax purposes, a great many questions remain to be answered as the
Internal Revenue Service and the professional confront one another
over as yet unexplored tax problems. In this emerging relationship,
the professional corporation has been characterized as a "new creature"
likely to "provide stimulation and challenge to the Service and taxpayer alike. ' 2 In other words, while the government has surrendered
the battle over recognition, guerilla warfare has replaced frontal engagements in the open field and the conflict is expected to continue in
3
numerous skirmishes over Internal Revenue Code interpretations.
The upshot of the professional corporation's newly acquired status
is two-fold: first, an increasing number of professionals will take advan-
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1 Technical Information Release No. 1019 (Aug. 8, 1969), which reads in part:
The Internal Revenue Service . . . is conceding that organizations of doctors, lawyers, and other professional people organized under state professional association acts will, generally, be treated as corporations for tax purposes.
2 Worthy, IRS Chief Counsel Outlines What Lies Ahead for Professional Corpora-

tions, 32 J. TAx. 88, 93 (1970).
3 Id. at 89, where the author stated:
While the tax benefits of operating as a corporation may be substantial, the
mere fact that a professional organization incorporates under a state statute and
is recognized as a corporation for tax purposes does not necessarily mean that it
will have a clear track as far as securing these benefits is concerned.
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tage of the opportunity to incorporate, and second, there will be a
burgeoning confusion between the Code and the inevitable multitude
of self-styled corporate forms. It is perhaps an understatement that
"there may still be certain other hurdles to surmount before achieving
the tax consequences desired." 4 Among these hurdles, allocation of income, reasonable compensation, unreasonable accumulation of earnings, personal holding company status, and treatment of nonqualified
deferred compensation arrangements are sure to be included. This artide will not attempt to deal with all those problem areas5 but will
focus upon the federal income tax consequences to both the professional corporation and its shareholder-employees of present and future
compensation, with some detailed planning suggestions about customized retirement plans (arrangements outside the scope of non-discriminatory retirement plans qualified under sections 401-04 of the Internal
Revenue Code). A few peripheral observations will be made along the
way concerning the problems of income reallocation and personal holding company status.
I.

REASONABLE

COMPENSATION

Section 162(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code permits a deduction for the payment of reasonable salaries and "other compensation for
personal services actually rendered." 6 The implementing regulation indicates that compensation paid to employees who are also shareholders
of the corporate employer will be scrutinized to determine whether
some of the ostensible compensation constitutes, in reality, a dividend
distribution or a payment for property.7 The regulation also explicitly
states that the compensation deduction must meet two tests: (1) it
must be reasonable, and (2) it must be purely for services actually
rendered." The professional corporation, therefore, faces strict Internal
Revenue Service inquiry as to the deductibility of compensation paid
to its employee-members, especially where the employees may be the
4 Id.

5 For a comprehensive overview of tax and non-tax aspects of professional corporations, see Flaster, Professional Service CorporationsRevisited, 62 N.J.S.B.J. 40 (1973); Ray,
Factors That Go Into Decision of Whether to Operate as a Professional Corporation,34
J. TAx. 130 (1971); Worthy, Incorporating a Service Partnership;Advantages and Disadvantages; A Checklist of Problems, N.Y.U. 31sT INST. ON FED. TAx. 207 (1973); Note, Incorporatingthe ProfessionalPractice:Federal Tax Aspects, 38 BROOKLYN L. REv. 449 (1971).
6 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a)(1). [All section references hereinafter are to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 unless otherwise indicated.]
7 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(1) (1958).
8 Id. § 1.162-7(a).
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only shareholders9 and a true arm's length relationship does not exist
between the corporation and the employee.' 0
CapitalDependence
In order to avoid the embarrassment of disallowance of compensation, the professional corporation must exercise great foresight and
diligence. One must recognize that the professional corporation is generally not capital dependent, but rather relies on the personal efforts of
its members to generate income. Where capital is a material incomeproducing factor, compensation paid to a shareholder-officer might be
disallowed to the extent that the monies paid "necessarily contained a
distribution of corporate earnings."" Thus, in Charles McCandless
Tile Service v. United States,12 the United States court of claims applied the dual test of the regulation and imposed what has been termed
as the "automatic dividend" rule, 1 3 concluding that although the compensation payments to the two principal shareholder-officers were
"within the realm of reasonableness,' '1 4 they were not fully for services rendered but were necessarily a return on equity capital. 15 Most
damaging to the taxpayer's position was the failure of the company to
declare or pay a dividend since its inception.' This omission left the
shareholders with no stated return on their invested capital and led
the court to conclude that there had in fact been a return, although
not specifically designated as such for tax purposes.1 7 Implicit in the
court's opinion was a determination that capital in the taxpayer's
ceramic tile contracting business was a material income-producing factor; that is to say, some part of the payments to the officer-shareholders
represented a return on their invested capital and was not attributable
to their personal efforts in conducting the corporation's business.
Until very recently, the absence of capital as a material income9 E.g.,

Heil Beauty Supplies, Inc. v. Commissioner, 199 F.2d 193, 194 (8th Cir. 1952).

10 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-7(b)(2) and (3)(1958).

11 Charles McCandless Tile Serv. v. United States, 422 F.2d 1336, 1340 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
12 422 F.2d 1336 (Ct. Cl. 1970).

1:3Holden, Has Court of Claims Adopted an "Automatic Dividend" Rule in Compensation Cases?, 32 J. TAX. 331 (1970). See also Note, Reasonable Compensation and the Close

Corporation:McCandless, the Automatic Dividend Rule, and the Dual Level Test, 26 STAN.
L. REv. 441 (1974).
14 422 F.2d at 1339.
1,5Id. at 1339-40.
16 Id. at 1339 k n.3.
17 Id. at 1340. The court found that a return of fifteen percent was "reasonable and
justified" and disallowed the compensation paid to the company officers-shareholders to
that extent. Id.
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producing factor has been an important element in judicial determinations that compensation payments were not excessive. In GladstoneArcuni, Inc., s where "[t]he only fixed assets . . . were office equip-

ment and a cutting table,"' 9 the court found that
[t]he demonstrated importance of the services of these two men in
the success of this difficult business, in which fixed assets played
such a minor part, justifies the payment to them of
the large part of
20
the gross income which those services produced.
However, the court also noted both the substantial net earnings re2
ported and the cash dividends declared by the company. '
In its Proposed Income Tax Regulations, the Internal Revenue
Service has recognized that capital is not a material income-producing
factor in the individual professional practices of doctors, lawyers, dentists, architects, and accountants. 22 The professional's capital investment, which under the proposed regulation may be substantial, 23 is to
be considered "as only incidental to his professional practice. 2 4 Since
the professional corporation might, by analogy, be deemed to have no
substantial capital investment, 25 the "automatic dividend" rule should
not be invoked; the test of reasonableness should therefore rest on
other factual circumstances more peculiar to the professional corporation.
Long-Range Compensation Problems
One might accordingly conclude that salaries, bonuses, and fringe
benefits paid to or for the account of a shareholder-employee would be
fully deductible by the professional corporation so long as such pay18

21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1016 (1962).

19 Id.
20

Id. at 1018.

21

Id.

22

Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.1348-3(a)(3)(ii), 36 Fed. Reg. 23,817 (1971).

Id. The proposed regulation declares that the individual professional's practice is
not capital dependent
even though the practitioner may have a substantial capital investment in professional equipment or in the physical plant constituting the office from which he
conducts his practice ....
23

Id.

Id. This is the rationale for the non-capital dependence declaration.
The proposed regulations, Proposed Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1348-3(a)(3)(i) and (ii), 36 Fed.
Reg. 23,817 (1971), deal with the treatment of earned income of an individual doing business in other than a corporateform and the relation between the service of the individual
and the capital necessary to conduct that business where both are "material income-producing factors." Id. § 1.1348-3(a)(3)(i), 36 Fed. Reg. 23,817. Therefore, they are not directly
applicable to the professional corporation, but are certainly apropos to the professional
corporation, which, like the individual practitioner, is dependent more upon its members'
services than on capital.
24
25
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ments were in line with compensation earned by the professional prior
to the incorporation of his practice. Indeed, such compensation should
be deductible notwithstanding the failure of the corporation to pay dividends and the complete distribution of all corporate net earnings in
the form of compensation. 26 Although a professional might initially determine his future compensation after incorporation on the basis of
pre-incorporation earnings, 27 long-term income determinations, assuming a growing, successful practice, must be handled on a different basis
to avoid tax complications. Above all, compensation over a period of
28
years must not only be reasonable, but also appear to be reasonable.
The pitfalls inherent in long-term compensation arrangements are
seen in the criteria set forth in Weaver Airline Personnel School, Inc.
v. Bookwalter,29 which involved a determination concerning the reasonableness of payments to a shareholder-employee in a non-capital
dependent enterprise. 30 The questions considered by the court were:
1) whether the payment was proportionate to the value of the service
rendered, 2) whether the payment exhausted the earnings of the corporation, 3) whether the corporation paid dividends, 4) whether the
payment was conditioned on company earnings, 5) whether the payment was determined before or after profits were calculated, and 6)
whether the payment fluctuated with earnings. 31 The first two criteria
can be arrived at on a current basis since they are short-term indicators. 32 However, the remaining criteria all relate to the long-term,
past performance of the corporation, its payments, and their interrelation; they form a pattern which weighs on the consideration of reasonableness. If a corporation has never paid a dividend, or pays a bonus
only after the year's earnings picture is clear, or varies its payments
directly with earned income, it will become more evident over a period
of years and will open the entire payment program to tax scrutiny.
26

The compensation need only be reasonable and for services actually rendered.

§ 162(a)(1).
27 But see notes 51-52 infra and accompanying text.
28 The burden is on the taxpayer to establish the reasonableness of compensation expenses for deduction. See, e.g., Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289-90
(1929).
29 218 F. Supp. 599 (W.D. Mo. 1963).
30 The taxpayer was conducting a school for the training of individuals in aspects of
airline work and it was conceded by the court "that the nature of the business [was] such
that more than nominal working capital [was] not required." Id. at 603.
31 Id. The court stated the "principal consideration" as being "the nature and extent
of the services rendered to the taxpayer by the stockholder employee." Id.
32 The value of services rendered and the exhaustion of corporate earnings are criteria
capable of year-by-year determination with little thought to prior tax years.
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These infirmities were dramatized in the tax court case of Nor-Cal
Adjusters,33 where the taxpayer paid bonuses to shareholder-officers
which were disallowed as disguised dividend distributions. 34 In determining that the payments were not deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses, the court relied on a number of factors since
"no single element [was] conclusive: 3, 5

36
1. Bonuses were in direct proportion to stock ownership.
2. No relationship existed between the bonuses and the income
37
production of the officers.

3. Little or no corporate income tax was paid.
4. No dividends were paid. 38
5. The corporation's president stated to an examining revenue
agent that he was not concerned about the failure of the corporation to secure status as a Subchapter S corporation as all
corporate earnings would be paid out in salaries and bonuses,
leaving no corporate income tax to pay. 39
In view of these factors, the court concluded that the payment of bonuses was governed by stock ownership and the availability of funds
and not by the productivity of the officers' services to the corporation.
In short, the long-term circumstances added up to a finding that the
bonuses were paid on the basis of stock ownership and availability of
funds rather than for services rendered.
One commentator has discounted the impact of the Nor-Cal decision upon professional corporations on the ground that the services involved in that case were of a routine nature whereas a professional
renders service for which he remains individually and personally responsible. 40 This distinction, however, is questionable. First, notwith33

30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 837 (1971).

34 Id. at 843-44.

35 Id. at 843.
38 Id. The bonuses were paid "in exact proportion to the stockholdings of the recipients." Id. The tax court further stated:
Perhaps the most significant factor indicating that the bonuses were essentially a dividend is that bonuses were paid only to petitioner's officer-shareholders
and not to any of its other employees.
Id.
3T Id. at 842. The court seemed to approve contingent compensation arrangements in
which "the contingencies were defined and delimited in advance" and where "[e]ach employee knew the exact percentage of his billings due him." Id. Nor-Cal failed to do either.
88 Id. at 843. The court found it "difficult to imagine" that a normal shareholder, one
who was not also an employee, would forego dividend payments while his company's funds
were paid out in salaries and bonuses to others. Id.
39 Id. at 839-40 & n.3.
40 Baker, Incorporationof the Firm, 26 TAx LAW. 77, 93-94 (1972).
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standing the element of personal responsibility, it may be argued with
some credence that many routine functions are performed in law offices,
such as the preparation of documents in real estate transactions, interrogatories in personal injury actions, and many other activities which
are performed in a growing number of law firms by paralegal personnel. Second, the factors upon which the tax court relied in Nor-Cal
remain as pitfalls to which every professional corporation is exposed:
the payment of bonuses unrelated to fee production, the failure to
declare dividends, the complete distribution of corporate earnings in
salaries and bonuses, leaving no corporate income tax to pay, and the
injudicious disclosure to a revenue agent of the corporation's intention
to distribute all its net earnings as compensation to the principals.
Another recent case of rather ominous portent for the professional
corporation is Barton-Gillet Co. 41 The facts indicated that David W.
Barton, Jr., was the controlling, and later sole, shareholder in a corporation which was engaged in the personal service promotion of college
programs and similar institutional business. 42 He was responsible for
98.2 percent of the firm's institutional accounts during the years for
which compensation was disputed.4 3 His total compensation" included
a salary, contribution to a qualified profit-sharing program, and a percentage of the corporation's gross profits from institutional sales.45 The
court acknowledged that the personal services rendered by Barton were
of incalculable value, but seemed overwhelmed by the fact that approximately sixty percent of the corporation's net earnings (after all
expenses except his remuneration) were paid as compensation to him.4"
The court was "disturbed by . . . . the relationship of the compensation to gross profit and taxable income," 47 and, with no more than a
note as to the percentage relationships, declared that the "relationships indicate that he was receiving excessive compensation." 4 8 Further,
the court stressed the failure of the corporation to pay dividends; it
recognized the non-dependence on capital, but found that "that [was]
no reason to justify its being totally ignored." 49 As to the argument that
41 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 679 (1970), aff'd per curiam, 442 F.2d 1343 (4th Cir. 1971).
42

29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 680.

43

Id. at 681.

44 The deferred and non-deferred compensation payments were aggregated for consideration of the reasonableness of the sum of the compensation paid. Id. at 687.

45
46

Id.
Id. at 688.

Id. Compensation paid was approximately 20 percent of gross profits over a three
year period. Id.
47

48

Id.

Id. See Jones, Is There a Dividend Requirement for Professional Corporations?, 34
J. TAx. 139 (1971).
49
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the compensation based on a percentage of gross profits was a contingent form of remuneration designed to provide an incentive, the court
was "unimpressed," implying that a sole shareholder needs no incentive.50
The determination of compensation, especially by the single professional, thus demands a delicate balance of interests. Since the professional quite obviously does not anticipate a reduction in income when
he incorporates, it is reasonable that his salary would be based on preincorporation income. This view has been criticized as "simplistic"
since
some of the professional fees obtained . . . [prior to incorporation] are attributable not to work done by . . . [the professional]

but to the services of associates, secretaries, technicians and assistants and to the existence or use of

library, office space, and goodwill. 51

. . .

assets such as equipment,

These items, however, should not be overstated; it should be noted
that fees traceable to office personnel are presumably returned in their
salaries and are not reflected in the professional's income, although the
52
same might not be said of assets unless depreciation had been taken.
The fall-out from disallowed compensation can be lethal. For example, a portion of salary-based contributions to a qualified profitsharing retirement plan may be disallowed. 53 The disallowed portion
will be treated as a dividend which is not eligible for the 50% tax rate
ceiling on earned income. 54 Further, in the case of corporate earnings
accumulations, the disallowed portion may be treated as a preference
dividend and not as a common dividend,5 5 thus increasing the accumu50 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 688. The courts appear to take a jaundiced view of incentive compensation paid to a dominant or sole shareholder. E.g., City Chevrolet Co. v.
Commissioner, 228 F.2d 894, 894-95 (4th Cir. 1956), afl'g per curiam, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
874 (1954), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 939 (1956); Irby Constr. Co. v. United States, 290 F.2d 824,
827 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
51 Eaton, Operation of a Professional Service Corporation, N.Y.U. 28TH INST. ON FED.
TAx. 1243, 1269 (1970).
52 Cf. Worthy, supra note 5, at 219-20.
53 If the Service successfully disallows a part of the total compensation (including
fringes) paid to an employee, the disallowance is usually apportioned among the component items. For example, if one-half the total compensation is disallowed, the tendency
is to disallow a deduction for half the salary, half the profit-sharing plan contribution,
etc., with respect to the particular employee.
54 § 1348. This section's preferential 50 percent maximum rate is available only for an
individual's earned income. § 1348(b) specifically defines "earned income." However, this
statutory definition does not include dividends or, explicitly, compensation received as a
distribution of earnings or profits made for other than services rendered. See § 911(b).
55 A common dividend may be considered as a distribution of property to a corpora-
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lated taxable income upon which the penalty tax on excess accumulated earnings is based. 56
Recommendations
What, then, can be done to assure the deductibility of compensation payments by the professional corporation? Notwithstanding the
uncertainty which necessarily inheres in the judicial determinations of
reasonable compensation, adherence to the following guidelines will go
far to preserve the deduction.
1. Compensation-salaries.Salaries paid to shareholder-employees
should conform to some standard of measurement other than share
ownership. In other words, compensation should never be in proportion to stock holdings; although if that is the result, and that result
was achieved without reference to shareholdings, it will not be defective
per se, rather, it will invite a closer examination of reasonableness.
2. Compensation-bonuses. Bonus arrangements should not be
tied to share ownership and should be related to contributions made by
the shareholder-employee to the firm's gross fee income, e.g., total billing attributable to his work, clients produced, time devoted to administrative matters and the like. Bonus arrangements should be set forth
prior to performance, carefully defined, and available to shareholderemployees and regular employees alike.
Discretionary bonuses in particular should be explicitly related to
identifiable contributions made by the employee to the firm's gross fee
income. Records should also be maintained concerning indirect contributions calculated to enhance the firm's prestige, such as teaching,
lecturing at continuing education seminars, active participation in
bar, medical or dental association sections and committees, and writing
for publication in professional journals. Documentation of this type is
tion's shareholders on a pro rata basis, with no preference given to any share or class of
stock. See § 316(a). If a preference results from a disallowance of compensation (as where
a portion of the compensation paid to a particular shareholder is declared to be a dividend to that shareholder and not to the class of shareholders), the amount will be considered a preferential dividend. § 562(c).
56 A preferential dividend is not entitled to the dividends paid deductions. § 562(c).
Therefore, the accumulated taxable income of the corporation, upon which the accumulated earnings tax of § 531 is applied, will be inflated by the amount of the preferential
dividend. If this increased total is found to be unreasonable pursuant to § 537, this will
constitute evidence of an intent to avoid income tax with respect to shareholders under
§ 533 and the corporation will, by operation of § 532, become subject to the § 531 tax. See
Dielectric Materials Co., 57 T.C. 587, 597-98 (1972), where this issue was raised but not
passed upon.
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particularly critical in the case of a shareholder-employee whose total
57
compensation exceeds 100% of fee billings attributable to his services.
3. Dividends. The yearly dividend is a salve which cures many
ills. A dividend substantiates the professionals' intent to conduct a corporation; it removes the suspicion that salaries and bonuses are covert
returns of capital contributions; and it also provides a handy defense
to a charge by the Internal Revenue Service that corporate earnings
have been unreasonably accumulated. Moreover, it improves the morale of the younger shareholders whose tax brackets are lower than
those of the older members and whose need for current income is
greater. However, the continual declaration of nominal dividends
should be avoided for the subterfuge it would appear to be.
4. Taxes. Bite the bullet. Your entire professional corporation
scheme will be for naught if at some time you don't pay a corporate
income tax. The Internal Revenue Service looks favorably upon compensation arrangements which co-exist with substantial pre-tax earnings and dividends."" With intelligent planning, taxes can be kept at
the lower 22 percent normal rate. It is simply unreasonable to assume
that a professional can incorporate and take advantage of business deductions and deferred compensation arrangements without also having
to pay taxes: plan for them.
5. Corporationrecords. Concise records must be kept to substantiate the compensation, tax, and dividend policies of the professional
corporation. Directors' resolutions should spell out the intent and rea59
son for each change in policy.
6. Disclosure to outsiders. The disclosure to a non-member of the
firm of your intent to distribute corporate net earnings in salaries,
bonuses and fringe benefits payments is an invitation to disaster. 60
57 In Klamath Medical Serv. Bureau, 29 T.C. 339 (1957), aff'd, 261 F.2d 842 (9th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 966 (1959), the court disallowed payments which were in excess
of 100 percent of the doctor's billings, declaring them to be a distribution of profits and
therefore not properly deductible as a business expense. 29 T.C. at 347. Among the factors
relied upon were: 1) the compensation contract required payment only for services rendered up to 100 percent of billings; there was no requirement that the taxpayer pay in
excess of the individual's billings, 2) the corporation intended to distribute all its earnings
to its member physicians, and 3) some of the money paid arose from operation of the hospital and not from the doctor's services (a prelude to the "automatic dividend" rule). Id.
at 348. Documentation could thus shape a "requirement" that the corporation be liable for
the discretionary bonuses, as well as provide the authorization for such payments to be
made. See id. at 349; cf. McClung Hosp., Inc., 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 449, 452-53 (1960).
58 E.g., Gladstone-Arcuni, Inc., 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1016 (1962).
59 See P-H POrFMssIONAL CORPORATION GurmE
10,021 (1973).
Go It is suggested that one never, but never, inform a representative of the Internal
Revenue Service of a mere intention to distribute all the corporate net earnings in salaries,
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Moreover, it evidences a failure to properly comprehend the purposes
of incorporation. Prior to incorporation it should be emphasized that
there should not and, indeed, cannot be any intent to run the corporation as a non-tax paying, non-income generating, non-dividend producing enterprise, solely for the professional's benefit. If the corporation
is properly conceived and directed, there should be no cause for any
member to make a damaging disclosure.
7. Repayment of disallowed compensation. As a last-ditch expedient to soften the impact of a disallowed compensation deduction, the
professional corporation should adopt a by-law (preferably upon incorporation), or include a provision in written employment contracts, requiring a shareholder-employee to repay his disallowed portion to the
corporation. If the by-law or employment agreement is in effect in the
year the compensation is paid, such repayment in a later year is deductible by the employee as a business expense under section 162.61
This fail-safe provision, however, is a mixed blessing. The presence of
such a provision in the by-laws or in employment contracts might be
construed by a revenue agent as an invitation to disallow compensation,
and, as one commentator has observed, might even be of some evidentiary value in establishing that compensation was excessive.6 2 The
solution to this dilemma probably lies in a by-law provision which
would lump disallowance payments with other reimbursement provisions to avoid the obvious.
Subchapter S Status
Conspicuously absent from the foregoing recommendations is a
suggestion that the corporation adopt Subchapter S status, 63 whereby all
the corporate net earnings are taxed to the shareholders, eliminating
tax at the corporate level. Obviously, if Subchapter S treatment was
feasible, no unreasonable or excessive compensation problems should
arise. However, a severe limitation is imposed on the tax-sheltered features of retirement plan contributions made upon behalf of a sharebonuses, and fringe benefit payments. The corporate records should not disclose such intention either. Needless to add, the facts will speak for themselves.
61 Vincent E. Oswald, 49 T.C. 645 (1968), acquiesced in, 1968-2 CUM. BULL. 2. See REv.
RuL. 69-115, 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 50.
62 2 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CoRPoRATIoNs § 8.13, at 109 (1971).
63 §§ 1371-79. Basically, Subchapter S is an election by certain small business corporations whereby the undistributed taxable income or net operating loss of the corporation
electing is included or deducted from the gross income of the electing corporation's shareholders. All earnings and losses are thus taxed to the individual shareholder and not to the
corporation.
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holder-employee owning more than 5 percent of the outstanding stock
of a Subchapter S corporation. 4 Annual plan contributions may not exceed 10 percent of the employee's compensation, with a maximum of
$2,500. Any contributed excess would represent current taxable income
to the employee. 65
The single most important reason for incorporating a professional
practice is the availability of a tax-sheltered pension or profit-sharing
retirement plan, contributions to which are not only deductible by the
corporation, but excluded from the employee's income as well. With
certain modifications not pertinent here, corporate deductions for pension plan contributions are measured by the actuarial cost of pension
benefits 66 while deductions for profit-sharing plan contributions may

reach 15 percent of compensation paid to employees covered. 67 Thus,
in the case of a $50,000-a-year surgeon employed by a professional corporation, the annual corporate contribution for his account in the
profit-sharing plan may be as high as $7,500, whereas if the corporation
adopted Subchapter S status, the contribution may not effectively exceed $2,500.
II.

SOME RANDOM OBSERVATIONS

ON ASSIGNMENT

OF

INCOME AND PERSONAL HOLDING COMPANY STATUS

Assignment of Income

Aside from problems of deductibility, compensation arrangements
can encounter difficulty at the other end of the pay scale. Section 482
of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes an allocation of the gross income among organizations, trades, or businesses controlled by the same
interests "to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of
any of such organizations, trades, or businesses."6 s Where a shareholderemployee renders a service through a professional corporation for
64 § 1379(d).
65 § 1379(b)(1).
66 § 404(a)(I)(C).

67 § 404(a)(3)(A).
68 § 482. The purpose of this section is

to place a controlled taxpayer on a tax parity with an uncontrolled taxpayer, by
determining, according to the standard of an uncontrolled taxpayer, the true taxable income from the property and business of a controlled taxpayer.
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1), T.D. 6595, 1962-1 CuM. BuLL. 43. See generally Deisi,
Section 482 Allocations of Income to Stockholders for Services Rendered to Closely-held
Corporations,1972 UTAH L. Rzv. 491; Egerton, Reallocation of Income: A New Threat to

Professional Corporations?, 58 A.B.A.J. 979 (1972); Katz, Can Section 482 be used to
Negate the Tax Eflect of a Bona Fide Corporation?,28 J. TAx. 2 (1968).
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which the corporation is paid in excess of the compensation received
by the professional, there might be grounds to reallocate the income
received to the shareholder-employee to more clearly reflect an arm's
length charge for such services.69 Thus, compensation to a member may
be found to be unrealistically low in relation to the services he is rendering; the corporation in such an instance would be considered a mere
conduit through which the professional was channelling his funds.70
Consider the older professional. He has reached the peak of his
earnings potential, probably has little current need for income, and
is thinking of establishing a retirement program using dollars taxed at
the corporate rate rather than at his income level rate. It would seem
to be to his advantage to incorporate his practice and to pay himself
a fraction of the fees he generates, leaving some of the excess to the
corporation for, inter alia, contributions to a qualified profit-sharing
plan and other fringe benefits. A significant part of his "earnings"
would thus be converted and taxed at presumably lower corporate
levels. However, under the rationale of Borge v. Commissioner,71 the
Commissioner could reallocate to this older professional that portion of
income for which he, and not his corporation, was responsible.72 In
Borge, it was found that the corporation which Borge had set up to
run his entertainment and poultry businesses had done "nothing to aid
Borge in his entertainment business;" 73 the corporation did little to
"earn" the income which Borge was paying over to it. With the income
so acquired, the corporation was paying Borge a "salary" which the tax
court believed was unreasonably low, i.e., Borge would not have entered into a similar contract with an unrelated party. 74 The court went
on to determine that Borge was not conducting the business of a corporation, but was instead pursuing his own career, 75 channeling his income through the corporation for the sole purpose of offseting his poul69 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1), T.D. 6595, 1962-1 CuM. BULL. 43 states:
The standard to be applied in every case is that of an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm's length with another uncontrolled taxpayer.
70 Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(b)(1), T.D. 6952, 1968-1 CuM. BULL. 218; Treas. Reg.
§ 1A82-2(b)(3), T.D. 6998, 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 144.
71 405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968), aff'g, modifying and remanding 26 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 816 (1967), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 933 (1969).
72 405 F.2d at 676. The corporation may be recognized, but that portion of its income for which a shareholder was solely responsible may be allocated directly to that shareholder "who alone was responsible for the production of such income." Id.
73.Id. at 675.
74 Id. at 676.
75 Id.
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try losses with his entertainment earnings.7 6 "[A]llocation was necessary
in order clearly to reflect the income of the two businesses under
77
Borge's common control."
It might be argued that the incorporation of a professional's practice to continue that very practice does not create the "two or more
organizations" necessary for the application of section 482 in allocating
income.78 However, where the service sought and the service rendered
have little to do with the corporation, i.e., it is the man not the corporation which is wanted, then it may be found that the professional
man is a trade or business himself, as is his corporation. Thus, in Rubin
v. Commissioner,79 the court found that
[i]t was Richard Rubin's special ability that Dorman wanted, and
it wanted nothing else from [the corporation] insofar as management services were concerned.8 0
There, Rubin had formed a corporation which subsequently entered
into a contract with a textile mill to provide both money and management services to the mill in return for certain compensation. It was
"understood" that Rubin, not the corporation, would provide the management services."' The corporation was paid sums in excess of Rubin's
salary and it was this money which was allocated.8 2 The professional
corporation should thus avoid undercompensation and should instead
strive to recompense its members at a level commensurate with the
income the member could attract in the marketplace.
Another allocation-of-income problem can present itself if the professionals do not in fact conduct themselves as a professional corporation. That was exactly the problem faced in Jerome J. Roubik, 83 a
pathological case, providing an object lesson in how not to operate a
professional corporation. The taxpayer was one of four radiologists in
76 Id. at 677. This was "the sole purpose of the arrangement" between Borge and the
corporation, Danica. Id.
77 Id.

78 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)(4), T.D. 6952, 1968-1 CuM. BuLL. 218 defines a controlled
taxpayer as "any one of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests." Since the purpose of § 482 is to achieve
parity between a controlled and uncontrolled taxpayer, it is essential that there exist a
controlled taxpayer.
79 460 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1972), aff'g per curiam 56 T.C. 1155 (1971), on remand from
429 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'g 51 T.C. 251 (1968).
80 460 F.2d at 1218.
81 429 F.2d 650, 652 (2d Cir. 1970). This was the first time the case came before a
United States court of appeals.
82 460 F.2d at 1218.
83 53 T.C. 365 (1969).
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Milwaukee who studiously ignored the corporation and continued
their separate practices, allocating income and expenses strictly in accordance with their individual practices. In brief, they conducted their
activities in the same manner as they were carried on prior to incorporation.8 4 It was found that the corporation "had nothing to do with the
earning of the amounts of income involved here,"8 5 and such amounts
thus earned were taxed to the professionals. Among other things, the
court noted that the professionals had "surrendered control over their
services to the corporation in form only;"8' 6 the corporation did not
enter into agreements on behalf of the professionals, did not own equipment, nor did it incur debts for normal corporate activities; and the
87
only "shared expense" among the professionals was for a secretary.
The consequences of a reallocation of income, the determination
that income is actually earned by and taxable to the shareholders and
not the corporation, are grave indeed. The corporate tax rate on net
income can be as low as 22 percent, whereas the individual may be in
the maximum 50 percent tax bracket (assuming the income to be derived from personal services). Even more serious is the virtual destruction of a qualified corporation-sponsored retirement program, contributions to which are based upon salary paid by the corporation to the
employee. If income received by the corporation is deemed taxable directly to the employee, the corporation is a mere conduit through
whose hands the income passes on its way to the alleged true earner
thereof, and the individual's salaried employment status disappears.
Furthermore, even if sufficient income is attributable to the corporation under the Service's reallocation approach to preserve the employee's salaried status, the benefits of a profit-sharing plan may be lost (or
at least seriously impaired) if the corporation is left with little or no
net earnings, since profit-sharing contributions can only be made out
of current or accumulated profits.
Without proper advance planning, reallocation of income from
the professional corporation to its shareholder-employees could be a
serious problem, particularly for an incorporated law firm. It seems to
be a common practice for a municipality, county, or other public body
to designate an individual, and not his firm, as counsel, and to pay for
his legal services by checks drawn to the order of the individual attorney pursuant to vouchers submitted in his individual name. In like
84 Id. at 372.

85 Id. at 381.
86 Id. at 379.
87 Id.
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manner, an individual attorney may be a salaried, part-time county employee, such as prosecutor or solicitor for the governing body. It is
suggested that the reallocation-of-income problem in these and similar
circumstances may be avoided by including a provision in the firm's
employment contract stating that all professional fees earned by the
employee in whatever capacity shall be the exclusive property of the
professional corporation."8
Fee Turnover

Fees earned by -a professional and turned over to his corporation
pursuant to a rule or contract provision of employment will be taxable
to the corporation as income. However, the professional must still confront prophylactic rulings by the Internal Revenue Service regarding
the source and disposition of such fees. For instance, if a client insists
on making payment directly to the professional for services received,
and the services were rendered through or on behalf of the corporation, the professional may immediately endorse such payment to the
corporation and would then not be required to report the payment as
his own income.8 9
A 1966 revenue ruling calls for different tax treatment on what
appear to be similar facts. That ruling involved salaried full-time professors at a university medical school who were required by their employment contracts to turn over to their employer all fees received by
them in their "sundown" medical practices. The Service ruled that
such fees were includible in each employee's income but that the individual was entitled to a business deduction under section 162(a) for
the year in which the fees were turned over to the employer.90 One may
suppose that the distinction between the earlier rulings and the 1966
ruling is that the medical school professors were acting in a totally
different capacity in their private medical practices and could, there88 N.J.R. l:21-IA(e) provides:
It shall be lawful, ethical and proper for an attorney employed by a professional corporation, as part of the terms of his employment, to agree to turn over
to the professional corporation by which he is employed all fees, compensation
or reimbursement which he may be entitled to receive for his professional services,
regardless of where such professional services are rendered.
89 Rev. Rul. 58-220, 1958-1 CuM. BULL. 26. This procedure leaves room for abuse, as
where the professional cashes the payment, uses the proceeds for a period of time and subsequently turns over the funds to his employer. Thus, the revenue ruling requires that
the turnover occur "immediately" and goes on to suggest that, when in-service fees are
personally received, the amounts and disposition made be included in a separate schedule
on the professional's tax return. Id. See Rev. Rul. 65-282, 1965-2 GuM. BuLL. 21; Rev. Rul.
58-515, 1958-2 GUM. BuLL. 28.
90 Riv. Rul. 66-377, 1966-2 CUM. BULL. 21.
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fore, not be considered agents of their employer, a point that was
stressed in the 1958 and 1965 rulings.9 1 If this distinction is sound,
employees of an incorporated law firm who are required by their employment agreements to turn over all fees to the corporation would
seem to fall within the ambit of the 1966 ruling with respect to director's fees paid by general business or banking corporations and fiduciary commissions. The point is somewhat academic so long as fees are
remitted to the corporation in the same year in which they are received.
The employee is simply put to the burden of making two wash entries
on his individual income tax return: one to include the item in gross
income, the other to deduct it. The only hazard that may arise is from
a year-end payment, which the employee (perhaps diverted by traditional holiday conviviality) neglects to turn over until early in the new
year.
PersonalHolding Company Status

Closely related to the reallocation of income problem is the specter
of personal holding company "treatment." Section 541 imposes a confiscatory 70 percent surtax upon undistributed personal holding company income. A personal holding company is a corporation in which
more than 50 percent of the outstanding stock is owned by no more than
five individuals.9 2 Personal holding company income includes
[a]mounts received under a contract under which the corporation
is to furnish personal services; if some person other than the corporation has the right to designate (by name or by description)
the individual who is to perform the services, or if the individual
who is to perform the93services is designated (by name or by description) in the contract,
94
but only if such individual is at least a 25 percent shareholder.
Professional corporations of two or more members should be able
to prevent personal holding company treatment by refraining from the
creation of personal holding company income. This can be accomplished by establishing the common practice of refusing to permit clients the contractual right to designate the individual who is to perform
the service. 95 Most law firms, for example, no longer handle a client
91 See note 89 supra.
92 § 542(a)(2). There is an additional requirement that at least sixty percent of the
company's adjusted gross income be earned as personal holding company income.
§ 542(a)(1).
93 § 543(a)(7)(A).
94 § 543(a)(7).
95 See Treas. Reg. § 1.543-1(b)(8)(iii), Example (3), T.D. 6308, 1958-2 CuM. BuLL. 279,
which provides in part:
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exclusively through a single attorney. One attorney brings in the client,
another attorney, in whose "field of preference" the client's problem
lies, prepares the case, a third attorney might do the research and represent the client on motion days, and a fourth attorney handles the
trial. Adherence to such standard procedures should effectively reinforce
the right of the corporation, not the client, to assign a professional to
a particular case, and might be so indicated in any contracts entered
6
into with clients.9
The Single Professional

The single professional and the highly specialized professional present unusual and unresolved problems regarding personal holding company treatment. Although the expectation of a client that a particular
attorney will handle his affairs is insufficient to constitute a "designation" within the meaning of section 542, 97 the single professional can
hardly dispute the presumption of "designation" by his client.9 8 One
solution would propose that the professional never retain undistributed taxable income; 99 another would suggest that the "right" to bring
other professionals into the corporation may avoid the designation
problem. 10 0 As a last resort, one could rely on the expressed belief that
The individual who was to perform the services was not designated (by name or
by description) in the contract and no one but the N Corporation had the right
to designate (by name or by description) such individual.
96 See Taylor, PHC Penalty Tax: Steps That Corporationsof Professionals Can Take
to Sidestep It, 34 J. TAx. 141 (1971); Note, Professional Corporations:Personal Service Contracts: A Hidden Pitfall in the ProfessionalCorporation,23 OKuA. L. R v. 438 (1970).
97 See S.O. Claggett, 44 T.C. 503 (1965), acquiesced in, 1966-2 CuM. BULL. 4. The court
stated:
[T]here existed no contract
specifying by name or description that Sam
[owner of all capital stock of the subject corporation] would be the person to perform the services . . . even though we recognize that all persons involved probably expected that Sam would render the services .
44 T.C. at 513.
98 But see S.O. Claggett, 44 T.C. at 513 (1965), where the court went on to strictly
construe § 543(a)(7):
For amounts to constitute personal holding company income ...
they must
be paid under a contract designating the person to render the services.
(emphasis added). However, according to Rev. Rul. 69-299, 1969-1 Curm. BULL. 165, a "contract" may be oral as well as written, thus compounding the single professional's potential
problem of "designation."
99 Taylor, supra note 96, at 142.
100 See Loening, PersonalHolding Companies: Re-Viewing an Old Problem; New Implications,N.Y.U. 29H INST. ON Fan. TAx. 815, 829 (1971); cf. Rev. Rul. 59-172, 1959-1 CUM.
BuLL. 144, which conditioned the introduction of additional agents into the firm on the
fact that in the instant ruling
[t]he personal services involved . . . [were] not unique and might conceivably
be substituted without apparent effect on the contractual relationship . . . .
Id., 1959-1 CUM. BuLL. at 145.
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while a single professional is probably technically a personal holding
company, in practice, no such finding would be pursued. 10 1 However,
the professional who has achieved the status of being able to offer a
unique service to his clients may find himself in the unhappy position
of being likened to an entertainer whose unique talents cannot be
duplicated by another performer. 02 In such a case, the Code provision
would apply more readily in finding a holding company to the extent
that the legislative purpose is germane: the House and Senate Committee Reports state that the personal holding company provisions are
aimed at "incorporating talent," e.g., athletes and entertainers 0 3 Thus,
the professional with unique talents should seek a corporate entity
with sufficient members to allow shelter from holding company status
via stock planning or the 25 percent holding company income exclusion mentioned above.
It is submitted that, except in the clearest of cases involving retainer agreements in which the professional is specifically named or the
right to designate is specifically reserved by the client or hospital, personal holding company status should present no problems. The arrangements discussed above involving appointments of individual attorneys as solicitors for municipalities and other public bodies involve
no personal holding company risks. The agreements in those cases do
not require the professional corporation, through a particular employee, to render services to the client. Quite the reverse is true. The
client looks only to a particular attorney and makes its arrangements
exclusively with him.
III.

QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLANS

An adequate review of the tax and other considerations concerning
qualified retirement plans would require a separate article. 10 4 A few
salient observations on the structuring of such plans by professional
corporations will suffice here. Essentially, two types of plans are available, a pension plan and a profit-sharing plan.0 5 A pension plan may
be of the fixed benefit variety, under which annual contributions are
101 Taylor, supra note 96, at 142.
102 See Newland, Should Today's Professional Corporations be Liable for the PHC
Penalty Tax?, 37 J. TAx. 26, 27 (1972).
103 See id. at 28; H.R. RE'. No. 1546, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1937); S. REP. No. 1242,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1937).
104 See generally Beck, Coping With New Developments Affecting Qualified Plans of
Small and Professional Corporations, N.Y.U. 30tH INST. ON FED. TAX. 567 (1972); Grayck,
Taxation of Distributions from Qualified Plans, 28 TAx L. Rav. 233 (1973).
105 § 401.
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actuarially determined in order to provide guaranteed benefits upon
retirement, or a money purchase plan, under which fixed contributions, not tied to profits, are made, with benefits to be determined accordingly. 0 6 A profit-sharing plan differs from both fixed benefit and
money purchase pension plans in many respects, but most significantly
in its lack of a fixed annual commitment. 10 7 Profit-sharing plan contributions are, of course, made only out of profits and need not be made
each and every year; it is enough that they be "recurring and substantial."'' 08 Retirement benefits are determined solely by the amount of
the contributions plus earnings thereon credited to each plan participant. Since no contribution formula is required, it is readily apparent
that a profit-sharing plan affords maximum flexibility which makes it
more attractive to professional corporations with few shareholders.109
A problem is raised by the conflict in objectives between older and
younger professionals. The older practitioner has achieved a comfortable income status, his children may be grown and educated and, notwithstanding the maximum tax rate of 50 percent on earned income,
he desires to put some earnings aside on a tax-sheltered basis for his
retirement. The younger professional, on the other hand, has substantial financial obligations. His children are growing and remain to be
educated, and perhaps he has not yet repaid loans incurred to attend
professional school. He therefore takes a somewhat less than enthusiastic view of a retirement plan. Two expedients are available to reconcile these conflicting points of view. One is the method of determining
covered compensation under the profit-sharing plan; the other is the
utilization of a cash-deferred option arrangement.
Limitation of Covered Compensation

A qualified profit-sharing plan must predetermine the formula by
which it allocates contributions to the participants of the plan. 10 The
formula must be definite,"' and may use either total compensation or
basic compensation as a contribution base. 112 Thus a plan may restrict
106 Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i), T.D. 6722, 1964-1 CUM. BULL. 144.
107 Id. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(ii), T.D. 6203, 1956-2 CUM. BULL. 218.

108 Id. § 1.401-1(b)(2), T.D. 6675, 1963-2 CUM. BuLL. 151.
109 See note 107 supra; Rev. Rul. 56-366, 1956-2 CUM. BuLL. 976, amplified by Rev.
Rul. 63-117, 1963-1 CUM. BULL. 92. Its disadvantage is the absence of the discipline of a
fixed annual contribution obligation.
110 The manner in which profits are to be allocated to plan participants must be set
forth, but the portion of profits which are to be subject to distribution need not be predetermined. See note 107 supra.
111 Id.
112 § 401(a)(5); Rev. Rul. 69-421, 1969-2 CUM. BuLL. 59, declared obsolete in Rev. Rul.

1974]

SHAREHOLDER-EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION

193

the definition of covered compensation to basic salary and exclude bonuses. Assuming that the two practitioners have agreed that their current compensation shall be equal, the corporation will pay the older
shareholder a much higher basic salary than the younger shareholder,
making up the difference with a year-end bonus. So long as total compensation is reasonable and is paid for services actually rendered, no
excessive compensation problem should arise merely because of the
disparity in bonuses. Of course, the aggregate compensation, including
profit-sharing plan contributions, paid with respect to the older shareholder will be greater than the aggregate compensation paid to or for
the benefit of the younger principal, but this can usually be justified
by the senior's greater experience, professional stature and reputation,
and larger client or patient following.
Limiting the contribution base to basic salary and excluding
bonuses therefrom also affords more flexibility in the establishment of
compensation policies in larger firms, not only with regard to profitsharing plans but as to money purchase pension plans as well. If plan
contributions are based upon total compensation, including bonuses
(and overtime for the non-professional staff), the increased plan costs
may have a chilling effect upon an otherwise liberal bonus policy. For
example, if the firm adopts the practice of contributing 15 percent of
covered compensation to its profit-sharing plan and declares bonuses of
$100,000 (including bonuses to non-professional employees covered by
the plan), the cost of the plan has increased by $15,000. The same observation can be made about a money purchase pension plan under
which contributions are a percentage of compensation.
Cash-Deferred Option Plan
The other method of reconciling the conflicting objectives between older and younger shareholders is the cash-deferred option
profit-sharing plan. Under this arrangement, each employee covered by
the plan, at some predetermined date prior to the corporation's annual
contribution, is permitted to elect to take all or a part of his share
of the annual contribution in cash and to have the employer contribute
72-488, 1972-2 CuM. BULL. 649, restated with updated references in INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, GumES FOR QUALIFICATION OF PENSION, PROFIT-SHARING, AND STOCK BONUS PLANS, PUBLICATION 778 (1972), Announcement 72-53, 1972 INT. REV. BULL. No. 19, at 11 states in part:
[T]otal compensation (which may include bonuses, commissions, or overtime pay),
basic compensation, or regular rate of compensation may be used, provided that
whatever is used is consistently and uniformly applicable to all participants.
Rev. Rul. 69-421, pt. 5(h), 1969-2 CUM. BULL. at 76.
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any balance to the profit-sharing trust. 113 Although this method tends
to be more equitable from the younger shareholder's point of view
than limiting the contribution base to basic salary, it is burdened with
two major hazards: the ever-present risk of plan disqualification, and
the employee's exposure to current income tax liability from the deferred (non-cash) portion on the ground of constructive receipt. 114
Suffice it to say that before the corporation adopts a cash-deferred
option profit-sharing plan, all facets of the option must be explored in
detail, with mathematical calculations made of the percentages required not only to qualify the plan initially, but to make certain that
the plan will not be discriminatory in its operation." 15
Vesting
A final comment concerning the adoption of a qualified retirement
plan is in order. It is not uncommon for both pension and profitsharing plans to require a minimum period of service before an employee of the corporation becomes eligible to participate. Professionals

who have just incorporated their practice, cognizant of the turnover
in non-professional personnel, may wish to impose a waiting period of
one or more years as a condition to employee participation. What is
often overlooked, and what their professional advisers must point out
to them, is that the employee status of the shareholders commences
with the formation of the corporation. While credit may be given to
common-law employees for prior service with the predecessor entity,
no such credit is permitted for prior service as a partner or sole proprietor.a16
118 See Simmons, Qualified Deferred Compensation Plans 1972: Maximum Benefit for
Corporate Executives at a Minimum Cost, N.Y.U. 31sr INST. ON FED. TAX. 895, 923-24
(1973).
114 Id. at 924.
115 See § 401(a)(3)(A), § 401(a)(3)(B) (either of which may qualify a plan), § 401(a)(4).
The mathematics involved in cash-deferred option profit-sharing plans can be quite complex. For example, Treas. Reg. § 1.401-3(c), T.D. 6203, 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 228, provides
in part:

Thus, in case a plan permits employees to receive immediately the amounts allocated to their accounts, or to have such amounts paid to a profit-sharing plan for
them, the employees who receive the shares immediately shall not, for the purpose
of section 401, be considered covered by a profit-sharing plan.
Yet, Rev. Rul. 56-497, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 284, allows participation in a plan to be
"weighted." Thus, one who elects to take immediately one-half of his allowed amount and
to have the balance contributed to the plan will be considered a half participant; he is
considered to be covered by the plan to the extent of the deferred payment. For a good discussion of the mathematics of qualification see Simmons, supra note 113, at 926-28.
116 Rev. Rul. 69-421, 1969-2 CUM. BULL. 59, declared obsolete in Rev. Rul. 72-488,

1972-2 CuM. BULL. 649, restated with updated references in

INTRNAL. REVENUE SERVIcE,
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Thus, if the shareholders wish immediate coverage for themselves
as corporate employees, the plan must contain no waiting period, and
all employees, including the non-professional staff, must be covered
immediately. This is not quite as bad as it sounds. First, the plan should
specify immediate coverage for all employees on the corporation's payroll as of the effective date or on any subsequent anniversary date.117
Hence, the new secretary or receptionist hired one month after the
plan becomes effective will not be eligible to participate in the plan
for eleven months (and she may be discharged or quit during that
period). Second, the Internal Revenue Service permits full vesting
under profit-sharing plans to be delayed for up to ten years, with graduated vesting during that time. 118 Under a plan calling for vesting of
contributions and benefits at the rate of 10 percent annually, an employee who resigns or is discharged after two years of employment is
entided to only 20 percent of his or her plan account. The balance is
allocated proportionately among the remaining employees covered by
the plan; 119 a continued employer-employee relationship is thus encouraged.
IV.

NON-QUALIFIED DEFERRED COMPENSATION

ARRANGEMENTS:

A PACKAGE BuY-OUT PROPOSAL

The traditional approach to the disposition of the interest of a
retired or deceased shareholder in a closely held corporation involves
GUIDES FOR QUALIFICATION OF PENSION, PROFIT-SHARING, AND STOCK BONUS PLANS, PUBLICA778 (1972), Announcement 72-53, 1972 1NT. REv. BULL. No. 19, at 11 states:

TION

[P]artners and sole proprietors are not employees ....
Neither are they to be
credited for services as partners or sole proprietors prior to becoming employees
in a successor corporation, either for prior service benefits or for meeting eligibility
requirement.
Rev. Rul. 69-421, pt. 2(j)(1), 1969-2 CUM. BULL. at 64; Treas. Reg. § 1.401-10(b)(4) (1963)
(may credit self-employed individual or a common-law employee); see Rev. Rul. 69-144,
1969-1 CuM. BULL. 115.
117 See Rev. Rul. 73-382, 1973 INT. RaV. BULL. No. 38, at 8 (coverage for added employees determined as of the anniversary date of the plan); Rev. Rul. 70-75, 1970-1 CUM.
BULL. 94 (dual eligibility requirements approved where present employees can meet the
requirements for new employees at the time the plan is established).
118 Vesting schedules are peculiarly subject to the "house rules" of each IRS district
office. There may be no difficulty in securing favorable determination letters from a district director's office for profit-sharing plans of business corporations calling for vesting at
the rate of 20 percent every two years, but the same office may insist upon vesting at the
rate of 10 percent annually for plans of professional corporations on the ground that
doctors and lawyers have a high turnover in secretarial and clerical personnel. See H.R.
4200, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 221 (1973), which outlines the proposed minimum standards for
vesting of a qualified retirement plan.
119 See Beck, supra note 104, at 581-83, where the author discusses possible plan dis-
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the redemption of his shares by the corporation for a predetermined
price or pursuant to a formula agreed upon to determine the price.
The arrangement is frequently funded 120 by life insurance carried by
.the corporation on the lives of its shareholders (at least those actively
participating in the business), the proceeds of which are applied to
redeem the interest of a deceased shareholder whose estate is benefited
in several ways: the preservation of liquidity, the exclusion of the redemption proceeds from income tax and, with a properly drawn agreement, the absolute fixing of the value of the shares for federal estate
121
tax purposes.
The retired shareholder, on the other hand, is entitled to capital
gains treatment on the redemption of his shares and, if the corporation
pays him in installments, the transaction qualifies for tax purposes as
an installment sale under section 453(b), provided that payments made
in the year the shares are redeemed do not exceed 30 percent of the
redemption price. 2 2 Further, post-mortem installment payments to the
estate or beneficiary of a retired shareholder qualify as income in re123
spect of a decedent under section 691 (c).
The redemption by the corporation of the shares of a retiring
shareholder can be troublesome. Without the availability of life insurance proceeds, corporate surplus may be insufficient to pay for the
shares, and a corporation is not permitted to acquire its own outstanding shares except out of surplus. 12 4 This could be a serious problem
for professional corporations, many of which distribute all their earnings in dividends, retirement plan contributions, and other fringe benefit payments. Moreover, payments made by a corporation to redeem its
shares are not deductible for income tax purposes; 125 and, while the
professional corporation is no longer obligated for the retired shareholder's salary, neither does it have the benefit of his fee production.
qualification problems inherent in vesting schedules which become discriminatory because
of their operation.
120 The term is used here in its loose, but commonly understood sense. The income
tax treatment of true funded arrangements will be discussed in detail later on in this article.
121 But not, unfortunately, for New Jersey Transfer Inheritance Tax purposes. See
Schroeder v. Zink, 4 N.J. 1, 71 A.2d 321 (1950). See Ben-Horin, Use of Life Insurance to
Fund Buy-Out Agreements, N.Y.U. 28TH INST. ON FED. TAx. 819 (1970).
122 § 453(b)(A)(ii).
123 That portion of the federal estate tax attributable to the post-mortem payments
is deductible by the recipient for income tax purposes. Rev. Rul. 71-507, 1971-2 CuM. BuLL.
331.
124 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:7-16(l) (1969).
125 § 302(a).
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Package Buy-Out Proposal

In order to alleviate these problems for the corporation, without
unduly increasing the income tax burden of the retired shareholder (or
the estate or beneficiary of a deceased shareholder), it is suggested that
a buy-out arrangement be fragmented into two components which,
taken together, reflect the true value of the professional's contribution
to the firm. One component, reflecting his capital contributions, would
be represented by an agreement to purchase his shares upon retirement
or death for a price equal to their book value at or near the operative
date, 128 with the proceeds of life insurance included in book value in
the case of a deceased shareholder. 2 7 The other component, reflecting
his contribution of services performed, clients or patients produced,
continued good will, etc., would be embodied in a non-qualified deferred compensation arrangement pursuant to which the retired shareholder, or his estate or beneficiary, would be paid a specified percentage
of his highest salary. The percentage should vary according to his
years of service with the firm.1 8 Payments would extend over a definite
period of years, with post-mortem payments made to the shareholder's
estate or designated beneficiary.
Payment for the departed principal's shares in the firm may be
made in one lump sum or in periodic installments, depending upon the
corporation's cash position at the time. In any event, his shares must
be transferred within 375 days after his death or, in the case of retirement, within 90 days after he becomes disqualified to own shares in
the professional corporation. 129 Theoretically, a physician, dentist,
architect, or accountant may retain his share ownership in the corporation following retirement, so long as he keeps his license to practice (although it is not customary to do so). An attorney, on the other
hand, must surrender his shares within 90 days after retirement, as a
New Jersey supreme court rule requires active employment with the
0
corporation as a condition of share ownership. 13
128 It is suggested, in all fairness to the departing shareholder, that the value of his
shares be determined by averaging their book value over the 12 calendar months immediately preceding the date of death or retirement to avoid the adverse impact of large
bonuses paid prior to such date.
127 See In re Carew, 125 N.J. Super. 373, 311 A.2d 185 (App. Div. 1973).
128 As the deferred compensation arrangement is not part of a qualified plan, tacking
may be used to include the shareholder's service as a partner, proprietor or employee of a
predecessor entity.
129 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:17-13(c) (Supp. 1973-74).
180 N.J.R. 1:21-1A(d), which provides in pertinent part:

No person shall hold any shares of stock in any professional corporation engaged in the practice of law unless he shall actually and actively be engaged in
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Subject to the risk of excess compensation disallowance by the
Service, deferred compensation payments will be deductible by the corporation and taxable to the employee in the years in which the payments are made.1 3' From the retired shareholder's point of view, the
payments constitute "earned income" for purposes of the 50 percent
maximum tax rate, at least for one full taxable year after the year in
which substantial risks of forfeiture 18 2 of the payments are removed. 88
The Service has taken the position in the proposed regulations under
section 1348 that provisions in the agreement calling for forfeiture of
payments if, following retirement, the employee conducts himself in
a manner inimical to the corporation's best interests or engages in an
activity in competition with the corporation, do not constitute substantial risks of forfeiture.3 4 Thus, under a 36-month post-employment
payment arrangement, the retired shareholder will be entitled to
earned income treatment on the payments for a maximum of 24
months if his retirement occurs in January and payments commence in
that month. In fact, if the corporation's financial condition permits,
the agreement could be modified shortly before--or even after-the
shareholder's retirement to accelerate the payments in order to bring
35
them within the earned income grace period.
Post-mortem deferred compensation payments to the estate or
beneficiary of a deceased retired employee may qualify for the death
benefit exclusion of section 101(b)(2)(B), which provides that payments
to such estate or beneficiary are income tax-free up to $5,000, so long
as the employee's rights thereto were forfeitable at the time of his
the practice of law as an employee of such corporation, except for leave of absence
not to exceed one year and for absences on account of illness, accident, time spent
in the armed services and vacation ....
131 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-12(b)(2), 36 Fed. Reg. 10,799 (1971). See also Rev.
Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 CUM. BuLL. 174.
182 See § 83(c)(1) (definition of substantial risk of forfeiture).
183 § 1348(b)(1); Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.1348-3(b)(2), 36 Fed. Reg. 23,818 (1971).
134 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.1348-3(b)(4), Example (5)(iii), 36 Fed. Reg. 23,820 (1971).
This becomes a "facts and circumstances" test. Cf. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(c)(1), 36
Fed. Reg. 10,790-91 (1971).
135 But cf. Kerester, Developing Maximum Effective Use of Non-Qualified Deferred
Compensation Plans, N.Y.U. 31sr INST. ON FFD. TAX. 859 (1973). The author observed:
It is often assumed that deferral of income to post retirement years is desirable because the recipient expects to be in a lower tax bracket after retirement. In
some instances that assumption may prove to be erroneous, with an executive finding to his chagrin, after retirement, that the income is exposed to a higher tax
bracket upon receipt after retirement than it would have been had it been received at the time the services were rendered.
Id. at 862.
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death.13 6 A 1971 revenue ruling held that the balance of unfunded
deferred compensation paid to the widow of a deceased retired employee was eligible for the exclusion where the deceased employee's
rights to such compensation were forfeitable. 3 7 In that ruling, the postemployment condition which could have resulted in forfeiture of payments was a covenant not to engage in a competing activity. 13 8 This
approach should be contrasted with the position taken in the proposed
regulations to section 1348, discussed above, wherein it is declared that
a post-employment covenant not to compete will not be deemed a substantial risk of forfeiture in determining the eligibility of deferred
compensation payments for the maximum 50 percent tax rate. 3 9 Perhaps the distinction is explained by the difference in statutory terminology. Section 101(b)(2)(B) speaks in terms of forfeitable or nonforfeitable rights, while section 1348 and the proposed regulations
thereunder deal with substantial risks of forfeiture. A further explanation lies in an understanding of congressional purpose. Section 1348,
like the provisions dealing with income averaging, 40 is an averaging
device.14' A deferred compensation arrangement is also an averaging
device, constituting, as it does, an effort to minimize the impact of
graduated surtax rates by spreading compensation over a span of years
in excess of the employee's years of active employment. Congress may
have concluded that averaging benefits should not be compounded by
extending unlimited coverage of section 1348 to deferred compensation.
With respect to New Jersey attorneys employed by a professional
corporation, a post-employment non-competition covenant, the breach
of which results in forfeiture of payments, is subject to an additional
infirmity. Disciplinary Rule 2-108, adopted by the Supreme Court of
New Jersey, prohibits an attorney from being a party to any employment contract which restricts his right to practice after termination of
his employment relationship "except as may be provided in a bona
§ 101(b)(2)(B).
Rev. Rul. 71-361, 1971-2 CUM. BuLL. 90; see Hazel W. Pollnow, 35 T.C. 715 (1961),
acquiesced in, 1961-2 CUM. BuLL. 5.
138 Rev. Rul. 71-361, 1971-2 CuM. BuLL.90 states:
[Tihe company's obligation to make the payments was subject to the condition
that the employee not engage . . . in any manner or capacity ...
in any business
or activity that was considered competitive by the company.
189 See note 134 supra.
140 §§ 1301-05.
141 § 1348(a) precludes the use of income averaging under §§ 1301-05.
186

137
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fide retirement plan and then only to the extent reasonably necessary
to protect the plan."'142 The American Bar Association's version of the
rule contains a similar prohibition which reads: "[E]xcept as a condition to payment of retirement benefits."'148 It is submitted that the
ABA rule makes more sense. The public policy promoted by the disciplinary rule is maximization of the availability of legal services, a rationale which disappears upon a lawyer's retirement. Cessante ratione
legis, cessat et ipsa lex. 44 Moreover, the arrangement does not restrict
the lawyer's right to practice; it merely withholds retirement benefits
if he does. Finally, as indicated above, one of the considerations in
awarding post-employment benefits by way of deferred compensation
is the lawyer's contribution of clients during his years of active employment. It does not make good sense to pay a retired shareholder for his
contribution of clients produced if he takes the clients with him. Continued practice after disassociation might also diminish the goodwill
generated towards the professional corporation by reason of the shareholder's prior membership if he were to engage in a competing practice.' 45 In any event, DR 2-108 might support a Service determination
that a post-employment restrictive covenant lacks legal significance as
a meaningful forfeiture provision for purposes of both the $5,000 death
benefit exclusion and the earned income character of deferred compensation.
So long as the corporation's agreement to pay deferred compensation represents merely an unfunded and unsecured promise, the retired
employee includes the payments in his taxable income for only the
years in which they are actually received. The tax objectives of forfeiture provisions (e.g., a requirement to continue rendering consulting services and the prohibition against competitive employment) are
designed to preserve the death benefit exclusion of section
101 (b)(2)(B)146 and the maximum 50 percent tax ceiling on earned
142 N.J.R. DR 2-108(A).
143 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBmrrY, CANON 2, DR 2-108 (1971).
144 The reason for the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases. H. BROOM, A SELEcrION
OF LEGAL MAXIMS 159 (7th ed. 1874).
145 Purists will argue that a professional's clientele is not a commodity to be bought

and sold in the market place. Yet, medical and dental practices are frequently bought and
sold on the basis of gross fee volume plus the net book value of physical assets. The
buyer, frequently (but not necessarily) a younger associate of the seller, gambles that the
patients will continue to visit the same office.
146 The favorable income tax treatment accorded to post-mortem payments of deferred compensation to the estate or beneficiary of a deceased retired employee applies
equally to such payments made with respect to an employee who dies prior to retirement,
provided his rights were forfeitable. The forfeiture provision is usually found in a re-
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income provided by section 1348, at least to the extent possible under
the proposed regulations.
The two components reflecting the shareholder's contribution to
the corporation should be embodied in separate documents, possibly
as exhibits attached to the employment agreement. One instrument
would govern the disposition of shares upon death or retirement of
the shareholder, the other would cover the deferred compensation arrangement. There is a two-fold purpose for separate documents. First,
the distinction between payments in exchange for shares and deferred
compensation payments is accentuated for income tax purposes. As indicated above, the two types of payments have radically different income tax characteristics. Second, in the case of attorneys, separate instruments will eliminate any possibility of a violation of the New
Jersey supreme court rule prohibiting payment to a retired shareholder
or to the estate of a deceased shareholder (in the capacity of a shareholder) of any portion of the earnings of the professional corporation
derived from services rendered by it subsequent to the retirement or
147
death of the shareholder.
Funded v. Unfunded
The foregoing discussion has dealt essentially with unfunded deferred compensation arrangements, i.e., agreements under which the
employee has no enforceable rights in the funding media such as life
insurance policies, annuity or retirement income contracts, or trust
contributions, but merely relies upon the corporation's unsecured, unfunded promise to pay. Some professional corporation shareholders, particularly those whose fee generation is substantial, may be concerned
about the adverse effect of their death or retirement upon the corporation's future financial condition and its corresponding ability to provide the agreed benefits, and may thus desire that the benefits be secured in some way. This means that a funded arrangement will be
sought; but before the shareholder's eminently reasonable desire for
security is implemented, the income tax consequences of funded arrangements must be thoroughly understood.
A good place to begin is with two contrasting tax court cases illustrating the distinction between funded and unfunded deferred compensation arrangements and the income tax consequences thereof. In
Paul L. Frost,148 the agreement provided that the taxpayer or his heirs
quirement that the individual remain in the corporation's employ for a specified number of
years or until a stated age, such as 65.
147 N.J.R. 1:21.1A(d).
148 52 T.C. 89 (1969).
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would receive, upon his retirement or death, the cash value, face value,
or retirement benefits of certain insurance policies owned by his employer but which were transferred to a trust revocable only with the
taxpayer's consent. 49 The tax court held that premiums on the policies
were taxable to the employee for the years in which they were paid
by his employer. In a later case, it stressed that upon this transfer to
the trust, the policies were no longer among the employer's assets subject to the claims of its creditors and that they "were irrevocably committed to carrying out the agreement" with the employee. 150 In short,
the agreement was funded; the employee possessed enforceable rights
in the funding medium.' 5' Significantly, the agreement contained no
forfeiture provisions.
In David Centre,' 52 the deferred compensation agreement required
the employer to maintain insurance and pay the premiums as a means
of funding the arrangement.' 5' The employer possessed all the incidents of ownership in the policies except that it was precluded by
the agreement from borrowing on them.154 The tax court concluded
that the employee realized no economic benefit from the premium payments and thus no taxable income prior to death or retirement. 55 The
court pointed out that the policies at all times remained assets of the
employer subject to its creditors and that the restrictions on borrowing
merely enhanced the likelihood that the employer would make the future deferred compensation payments. 56 The arrangement, in other
Id. at 91-94.
David Centre, 55 T.C. 16, 20 (1970). The tax court found that Frost had received
the "present economic benefit" of insurance protection and, to the extent that his rights
to the cash surrender value of the policies were nonforfeitable, present benefit from the
payment of policy premiums. 52 T.C. at 96 & n.l.
151 Frost was content in knowing that his deferred retirement compensation was
funded, but he was charged with a tax for the present compensation benefits he received
on a current basis.
152 55 T.C. 16 (1970).
153 Id. at 17-18.
154 It was agreed that the employer would pay the premiums, would continue to own
and hold the policies, but would not incur any indebtedness against the policies. Further,
a forfeiture clause was included which stated that a substantial and willful breach by the
employee would terminate the employer's obligation to turn over ownership of the policies which had been conditioned on the attainment of 65 years of age or discontinuance of employment by Centre. Id. at 18.
155 The tax court found that the insurance policies were used to fund its "naked
promise" of deferred compensation and that as such it did not constitute a present economic benefit to employee Centre. Id. at 19.
156 The court specifically found that
[w]here the insurance remains an asset of the employer to which all creditors have
rights and the employee acquires no immediate rights thereto, he realizes no income from the payment of premiums on the insurance.
149

150

1974]

SHAREHOLDER-EMPLO YEE COMPENSATION

203

words, was unfunded since the employee possessed no enforceable

rights in the funding medium. 157
Consistent with the result in the Centre case was Revenue Ruling
68-99,158 in which the Service ruled that insurance may be used to secure the corporation's obligation to pay deferred compensation and
that the employee realizes no taxable income when the insurance contract is purchased so long as the corporation remains the sole owner of
the policy and the employee has no rights thereunder. In such a case,
the employee is taxed only on the deferred compensation payments
when they are received or made available to him. 159 The same result
obtains under the Tax Reform Act of 1969, which made substantial
changes in the tax treatment of deferred compensation arrangements. 160
Thus, under the package buy-out arrangement proposed in this
article, the professional corporation may purchase a life insurance policy, annuity, or retirement income contract to secure the payment of
deferred compensation to a retired principal without adverse income
tax consequences to the latter, provided that he has no enforceable
rights in the policy itself. It is even permissible, under the rationale of
Centre, to prohibit the corporation from borrowing on the policy withId. at 20 (citing to Casale v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957), rev'g 26 T.C. 1020
(1956), acquiesed in, 1959-1 CuM. BuLL. 66).
157 The court in Centre found Frost to be inapposite to the instant case, stating that
when Frost's employer transferred the policies to the trust, Frost "received something more
than a mere promise of future payment." Id. at 20-21. By foregoing the assurance of an
immediate vesting of rights in a retirement package, Centre avoided, albeit to his ultimate
disadvantage, taxable income on a current basis. The shoe was on the other foot in the
Centre case. The taxpayer argued that the insurance premiums were taxable income to him
for the years in which they were paid. As those years were barred by the statute of limitations, the acceptance of that argument might possibly have resulted in no income tax
liability with respect to the deferred compensation payments. Of course, in such a case the
mitigations provisions of § 1311, invoked where either the taxpayer or the government
assumes an inconsistent position, would probably have been applied. The tax court, in
view of its decision, found it unnecessary to address that issue.
158 1968-1 CuM. BuLL. 193.
159 In a similar ruling, it was held that where an employee had no present interest
in an annuity contract, compensation received under a contract, which the annuity funded,
was to be included in gross income only when it was received or "otherwise made available." Rev. Rul. 72-25, 1972-1 CUM. BuLL. 127.
160 The proposed regulations for § 83 provide, in effect, that no economic benefit, and
thus no taxable income realization, is conferred upon an employee if insurance is purchased by an employer to secure the payment of deferred compensation. Proposed Treas.
Reg. § 1.83-3(a)(1), 36 Fed. Reg. 10,790 (1971). The proposed regulations further state that
the term "property" includes both reality [sic] and personality [sic] other than
money and other than an unfunded and unsecured promise to pay deferred compensation.
Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e), 36 Fed. Reg. 10,791 (1971) (emphasis added).
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out thereby conferring a presently taxable economic benefit upon the
retiree. In like manner, if the professional employee dies prior to retirement, a portion of the life insurance proceeds will be used to secure
the payment of deferred compensation to his estate or beneficiary. The
income tax consequences will be the same as those for the retired employee. 6 1
Funded deferred compensation arrangements were the subject of
complex, extensive treatment under the Tax Reform Act of 1969,
which added section 83 to the Internal Revenue Code and amended
sections 402-04. The proposed regulations under those sections are positively prolix, particularly with regard to the concept of substantial risk
of forfeiture. 162 That concept is defined with such elastic, subjective
standards that it will be virtually impossible to fix in advance the income tax consequences of a funded deferred compensation arrangement. It is enough to observe here, without exploring the myriad of
complexities in the proposed regulations, that contributions to the
funding medium (e.g., irrevocable trust, retirement income, endowment, annuity, or life insurance contracts), pursuant to a funded deferred compensation plan, are taxable to the employee for the years in
which such contributions are no longer subject to a substantial risk of
forfeiture. This is defined to include, inter alia, a requirement that the
employee continue to render "substantial services.' ' 1 63 Thus, contributions to the funding media during the professional employee's
active employment are not currently taxable to him where, as is customary, the deferred compensation agreement conditions retirement
benefits upon employment for a specified number of years or until he
reaches a stated age. At the time of his retirement, however, all trust
contributions, premiums paid on annuity contracts, and cash values
of all other insurance policies may be taxable in the first year of such
retirement, 6 4 notwithstanding the fact that the agreement calls for payments over two or more years. The proposed regulations indicate that
post-employment forfeiture provisions, such as non-competition covenants, conduct inimical to the best interests of the corporation and the
like, will be measured by a variety of factors: age, alternate employ161 The estate or beneficiary of a deceased employee will be entitled to treat deferred
compensation payments as earned income under § 1348 to the same extent as if the employee had lived to receive the payments. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.1348-3(a)(4), 36 Fed.
Reg. 23,817 (1971).
162 See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(c)(1), 36 Fed. Reg. 10,790-91 (1971).
163 Id.
164 § 83; Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(b), 36 Fed. Reg. 10,790 (1971); see Kerester,
supra note 135, at 871-72.
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ment opportunities and the likelihood of obtaining them, skill possessed, health, and the employer's past enforcement practices. 165 It is
apparent that such covenants will not generally constitute substantial
166
risks of forfeiture.
Perhaps the most undesirable income tax consequence of funded
plans is the treatment accorded death benefits. The proposed regulation dealing with that subject indicates that death removes all substantial risks of forfeiture and that all prior funding contributions are not
only taxable in the year of death, but are includible in the deceased
employee's gross income for his last taxable year. 167 Thus the availability of the $5,000 death benefit exclusion of section 101(b)(2)(B) is
removed. The Treasury's position in this regard seems questionable
and it remains to be seen whether it will be perpetuated in the final
regulations.
V.

TANGENTIAL AsPEGTS:

CONTINUED

RELATIONSHIPS

AND ACCUMULATED EARNINGS

Post-employment Consulting Services
A qualified, non-discriminatory pension or profit-sharing plan
covering virtually all the corporation's employees frequently permits
payment of plan benefits to a retiring participant either in one lump
sum or in a few installments. In such event, the payment may be entitled to favorable tax treatment if made within one taxable year to
the employee or his estate on account of his death or separation from
the employer's service.168 A professional corporation may have both a
qualified retirement plan and a non-qualified deferred compensation
plan limited to selected personnel. The deferred compensation agreement customarily requires the retired employee to render occasional
consulting services to the corporation as a condition to continuing
benefits under the non-qualified arrangement, but this continuing relationship between employer and retired employee might jeopardize
the nature of payments made under the qualified plan.
Reg. § 1.83-3(c)(1), 36 Fed. Reg. 10,790-91 (1971).
See id. § 1.83-3(c)(2), Example (4), 36 Fed. Reg. 10,791 (1971).
167 See id. § 1.83-3(d), 36 Fed. Reg. 10,791 (1971).
168 § 72(n). Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1969, lump-sum distributions from qualified plans on account of death or separation from service were entitled to capital gain
treatment in the hands of the recipient. Since then, however, such distributions attributable to post-1969 employer contributions are taxable to the recipient on a 7-year forwarding averaging basis, i.e., somewhere between capital gain and ordinary income. See
§§ 72(n)(4)(A), 402(a)(5), 403(a)(2). See also H.R. 4200, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 703 (1973) (proposed changes regarding lump-sum distributions).
165 Proposed Treas.

166
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However, in Revenue Ruling 69-647,169 the Internal Revenue
Service declared that a lump-sum distribution from a qualified pension
plan, made on account of the recipient's separation from service, was
entitled to capital gain treatment even though the recipient, a retired
executive, was required under the terms of a post-employment agreement to render consulting and advisory services on a part-time basis to
his former employer. The facts presented relate that the agreement created a part-time relationship, contained a non-competition clause and,
though not clear from the ruling itself but nevertheless vital, provided
that the services were to be on "an irregular basis" for matters within
his "special competence."' 17 The ruling noted that the contract did not
establish a formalized schedule of work assignments; it did expressly
provide that no supervision would be exercised over his performance,
his schedule, or his absence from work. The question presented was
whether, under the above circumstances, the employee was separated
from the service of the employer within the meaning of section 402(a)
(2). The test, according to the ruling, is the continuation of an employer-employee relationship.' 71 Thus, if the retired employee's status is
essentially that of an independent contractor, a lump-sum distribution
from a qualified retirement plan will be accorded favorable tax treatment as a payment by reason of his separation from service. The contract addressed in the ruling was found to establish a separation from
service.
One may reasonably anticipate that deferred compensation plans
for professionals will require the performance of occasional consulting
and advisory services. The corporation will be loathe to deprive itself
completely of the senior practitioner's experience and accumulated wisdom. Indeed, the retiring shareholder, having completed years of a
satisfying, productive career, will certainly not be content to play golf
or tend the garden every day. So long as the criteria set forth in Revenue Ruling 69-647 are followed, the performance of consulting and
advisory services by the retiree should not jeopardize the favorable tax
treatment associated with a lump-sum distribution from a qualified
retirement plan. In order to protect the distribution, the ruling indicates that the deferred compensation agreement must clearly reflect the
following:
1) The retiree is to serve in an advisory capacity only in those
areas of his special competence;
169 1969-2 CUM. BuLL. 100.
170 Id.
171 Id.
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2) the retiree is expected to render his services only on a part-time
and irregular basis;
3) there is to be no formal schedule of duties; and
4) the employer will expressly exercise no supervision over the
employee's
a. performance,
b. compliance with directions, or
c. hours of work or absence therefrom.
Accumulated Earnings Tax

The final subject to be explored in this article is the effect of the
accumulated earnings tax 72 on a shareholder buy-out arrangement or
on a deferred compensation agreement. An important element in determining the application of the penalty surtax on accumulated corporate earnings is the "reasonable needs of the business." 178 What constitutes reasonable business needs has been the subject of much litigation, with the courts divided on the issue of whether an earnings accumulation to redeem a corporation's stock falls in that category. As for
accumulations intended to finance deferred compensation arrangements, however, the accumulated earnings tax seems clearly inapplicable under the theory that "[n]o management group would ignore the
174
existence of such a liability."'
Section 537, as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, expressly
acknowledges that the redemption of the stock of a deceased shareholder is a reasonable business need.'7

i

This new Code provision fur-

nishes little comfort, however, since it does not apply to a retiring shareholder; it is limited to earnings accumulated in the year of a shareholder's death, 176 and applies only to the amount required to pay death
taxes and funeral and administration expenses, and then only where
the value of the shares reaches certain specified percentages of the deceased shareholder's gross estate. 7 7 Moreover, reacquisition of a retired
shareholder's stock as a ground for showing a reasonable accumulation
of earnings is conspicuously absent from the regulations. 178
172 § 531 et seq.

§ 533(a).
Bremerton Sun Publishing Co., 44 T.C. 566, 586 (1965). In John P. Scripps Newspapers, 44 T.C. 453 (1965), the court found that the retention of earnings to meet the taxpayer's profit-sharing and retirement plans was "[s]ound business judgment." Id. at 470-71.
175 § 537(a)(2), (b)(1).
176 Treas. Reg. § 1.537-1(c)(1), T.D. 7165, 1972-1 CuM. BULL. 167.
177 See § 537(b)(1), § 303(b)(2)(A).
178 See Treas. Reg. § 1.537-2(b) (1959).
173
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In the case of Mountain State Steel Foundries, Inc. v. Commissioner,179 the court noted, inter alia, that a partial redemption of the
shares of a deceased shareholder would be treated as a sale under section 303, and not as a distribution of earnings a8 0 It concluded that because Congress had granted favorable tax treatment in such a situation,
"it hardly could have intended to penalize the corporation for doing
the favored act. ' '1 8 1 The court further stated that
[i]f disbursements to create a fund with which to purchase stock

serve a corporate purpose, surely the disbursement of l8the
created
2
fund in purchasing the stock serves the same purpose.
Here, reliance was placed on Emeloid Co. v. Commissioner,8 3 a decision from the Third Circuit court of appeals. In that case, the court
found that the corporate purchase of "key man" insurance was a
proper and essential corporate purpose. 8 4 Although the court in Emeloid found that the corporation was not bound to redeem the shares
of a deceased shareholder from the proceeds of the insurance, implying
that if so bound the purpose might not be proper, the clear emphasis
was on the underlying purpose of the insurance as a means of providing "continuity of harmonious management."' 185 Professional corporations based in New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania, states embraced by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, would appear to
be on solid ground on the issue of redemption as a business need, at

least where the purpose and requirement for corporate continuity is
shown. 8 6
284 F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1960), rev'g 18 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 306 (1959).
180 284 F.2d at 745
181 Id.
182 Id. But see Pelton Steel Casting Co. v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 278 (7th Cir), afi'g
28 T.C. 153 (1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 958 (1958) (accumulation of earnings for a reorganization of business through stock redemption and avoidance of declaration of dividends).
183 189 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'g 14 T.C. 1295 (1950).
184 189 F.2d at 233.
185 Id. The court further stated:
Harmony is the essential catalyst for achieving good management; and good management is the sine qua non of long-term business success. Petitioner, deeming its
management sound and harmonious, conceived of the trust to insure its continuation. Petitioner apparently anticipated that, should one of its key stockholderofficers die, those beneficially interested in his estate might enter into active participation in corporate affairs and possibly introduce an element of friction. Or
his estate, not being bound by contract to sell the stock to petitioner, might sell it
to adverse interests. The fragile bark of a small business can be wrecked on just
such uncharted shoals.
Id. (footnote omitted).
186 See Jack E. Golsen, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), aly'd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 940 (1971), where the court announced:
179
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It would certainly appear that the accumulation of earnings to
fund the redemption of shares upon the death of a professional corporation shareholder should constitute a legitimate corporate purpose.
The New Jersey Professional Service Corporation Act, for example,
requires transfer of the shares within 375 days following the shareholder's death; 187 and, in the case of an incorporated New Jersey law
firm, the shares of a retired attorney must be surrendered within 90
days after retirement in view of the supreme court rule that active employment with the corporation is a prerequisite to share ownership.1 8
It is difficult to conceive that a court would find that an earnings accumulation designed to finance a stock redemption mandated by state
law or administrative regulation is not a reasonable business need. The
required business purpose is also evident where state law does not require redemption (e.g., a retiring physician-shareholder of a New Jersey
medical corporation)8 9 due to the need for continuity and selectivity
of professional associates.
CONCLUSION

Although the discussion concerning the deductibility of current
compensation may seem infused with a jeremiad quality, it is quite
apparent that the courts in general, and the tax court in particular,
will not uphold compensation deductions merely because they are
reasonable and bear some relationship to the professionals' earnings
prior to incorporation of the practice. 190 Recent tax court decisions
give some intimation that that court will soon adopt the "automatic
dividend" rule promulgated in the McCandless Tile case;' 9 ' and this
will be of some concern to the larger professional corporations with a
substantial investment in physical plant. It is therefore incumbent
upon the tax advisors to professional corporations to remain sensitive
to developing judicial trends and, to the extent possible, to avoid their
undesirable consequences by means of prudent planning. If this article
[I]t is our best judgment that better judicial administration. [sic] requires us to
follow a Court of Appeals decision which is squarely in point where appeal from
our decision lies to that Court of Appeals and to that court alone.
54 T.C. at 757 (footnotes omitted).
187 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:17-13(c) (Supp. 1973-74).
188 N.J.R. l:21-1A(d).

189 Only attorneys at law are subject to the extra-statutory rules of the New Jersey
supreme court. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:17-3(2) (Supp. 1973-74).
190 See Worthy, Incorporating a Service Partnership;Advantages and Disadvantages;
A Checklist of Problems, N.Y.U. 31sT INST. ON FED. TAX. 207, 219 (1973).
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serves only to dispel the euphoric illusion that compensation deductions will continue to pass muster merely because the amounts correspond to pre-incorporation earnings of the shareholder-employees, it
will have served a laudable purpose.
The non-qualified deferred compensation arrangements discussed
above offer a flexibility denied to qualified retirement plans. Unlike
qualified plans, their coverage may be selective, and their provisions
concerning past service, vesting, retirement age, and the like, may be
tailored to the individual desires of the principals, unencumbered by
the intricate Internal Revenue Service rules applicable to qualified
plans.
Moreover, non-qualified deferred compensation plans are bound
to become more attractive with the passage of H.R. 12481, the Employee
Benefit Security Act of 1974. This pending bill will not only increase
qualified pension plan costs but will also substantially enlarge the compliance burdens associated with qualified plan administration. The
House bill, inter alia, limits the waiting period to one year or attainment of age 25 (whichever is later), requires full vesting in 15 years
with at least 50 percent vesting after 10 years, imposes limitations on
contributions and benefits not found in existing law, and mandates the
filing of registration statements and actuarial reports.
Accordingly, while pending congressional proposals may dampen
the enthusiasm of professionals for incorporation, particularly among
the larger firms, non-qualified deferred compensation plans, in tandem
with a modest qualified pension plan integrated with Social Security
for the benefit of the non-professional employees, remain as viable
alternatives.
The key attribute of the advisor to professional corporations is
vigilance. He must be alert not only to emerging judicial trends but
also to the impact of legislative proposals. Only then can he assist in
the preservation of his clients' hard-earned substance against the inroads of high income tax rates.

